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Exchange Market Intervention and Evidence of  
Post-Crisis Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes  





By examining exchange market intervention activities of the monetary authority 
of each country, we revisit an old debate on whether crisis-effected countries in East 
Asia, namely Indonesia, Korea, Singapore and Thailand, have gone back to  their 
pre-1997 rigid exchange rate policies, or, instead, have they actually moved to a 
more flexible regime? More importantly, if indeed there has been a shift from a rigid 
to a more flexible one, was the move a voluntary one, or mainly due to the presence 
of high market pressures on the currency? Given the absence of publicly available 
information on intervention in the foreign exchange market during the observation 
period, we propose an index of central bank intervention activity in the exchange 
market that also includes overnight market rates. Apart from applying the markov-
switching ARCH and the extreme value theory methodologies to the construction of 
the index, thresholds of exchange rate regimes are also generated and utilized to 
systematically classify the types of exchange rate regimes that these East Asian 
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1. Introduction 
In the September 2005 World Economic Outlook (WEO) report, the 
International Monetary Fund forecasted that the global economy for 2005 will grow by 
4.3 percent, slower than in 2004, but still at a relatively healthy pace (IMF, 2005). 
Despite a generally positive outlook, the WEO report has however drawn attention to 
excessive dependence of global growth on unsustainable current account deficits in 
the United States and in order to finance these deficits, the United States needs to 
pull in 70 percent of total global capital flows. This phenomenon is referred to as the 
global imbalances problem. 
In addition to a number of potential root causes, a few policy 
recommendations  have also been put forward in that report to commence and 
establish an orderly adjustment of the imbalances in the global economy. Among the 
policies prescribed for emerging markets in Asia is an adoption of a more flexible 
exchange rate policy, which should allow regional currencies in Asia to appreciate 
against the major world currencies, including against the US dollar. The stronger 
currencies in Asia should in turn provide a catalyst for a stronger demand for 
imported products, which includes those coming from the United States, a key 
trading partner in the region.     
The debates on the appropriate exchange rate policy actually resurfaced at 
the outbreak of the 1997 East Asian financial crises, and remained as one of the 
pinnacle challenges facing monetary authorities around the globe. Despite official 
announcements of a policy shift toward either the adoption of inflation targeting in 
countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Korea and the abandonment of a fixed 
regime in China and (the gradual relaxation of controls in) Malaysia in recent years, 
uncertainties over the de-facto exchange rate policies adopted by most emerging 
markets in East Asia remained high.  
The rapid stockpiling of the foreign exchange reserves since late 2000 by 
most economies in this region has, in particular, been at the centre of the exchange   4
rate policy debate (Table 1). A number of important views on this issue have 
emerged. One of them is the mercantilist argument. This view claims that aside from 
the desire to maintain exchange rate predictability, the reserve growth has been 
primarily motivated by desires of these countries to preserve an undervalued local 
currency and to enhance the international competitiveness of the newly emerging 
industries (Dean and Rajan (2004)). In the context of China, Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber (2003) interpret the reserve accumulation as largely motivated 
by the country’s export promotion strategy.  
Another view translates the high accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
as an insurance policy held against the future uncertainty of balance of payment 
position. Fischer (2001) nicely summarizes this point: 
“Reserves matters because they are a key determinant 
of a country’s ability to avoid economic and financial 
crisis. This is true for all countries, but especially of 
emerging markets open to volatile international capital 
flows… (pp. 1). 
   
A number of recent papers have examined and compared the importance of 
precautionary and mercantilist motives in the hoarding of the international reserves 
by developing countries (Aizenman and Lee (2005) and Dean and Rajan (2004)). 
The distinguishing objective of our paper is to contribute further on this debate on 
exchange rate policy, but without looking-through the perspectives of precautionary 
view versus mercantilist view. We, instead, revisit one of the old debate on evaluating 
the de-facto exchange rate regimes adopted by a number of East Asian economies, 
namely Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and South-Korea from January 1985 to 
December 2003.  
There has been a great deal of efforts expended on developing behavioural 
classifications of exchange rate regimes by either looking exclusively at the 
behaviour of nominal exchange rates, or considering fluctuations in both the nominal 
exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and   5
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2004)). These considerable efforts in developing so-
called de-facto classifications were mainly motivated by a crucial recognition that, 
until late 1990s, the Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is usually the primary 
source of information about the official or de-jure exchange rate policies pursued by 
member countries, takes at face value what countries announce.
1  
Despite the numerous efforts, however, we have not seen conclusive and 
consistent findings among them (Table 2). For instance, Kawai and Akiyama (2000) 
cannot conclusively classify the regime adopted in Indonesia in 1999. In contrast, 
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) categorize the exchange rate regime in Indonesia for 
that same year as independently floating.  There are also a number of limitations and 
criticisms against previous studies, particularly on the shortcomings associated with 
the methodologies used and the primary statistical assumptions of the empirical 
testing.
2 
In this study, our approach will be to verify the type of exchange rate regimes 
adopted by those four East Asian countries through the examination of the exchange 
market intervention activities of the monetary authorities of each country. Given the 
absence of publicly available information on the timing and size of the intervention in 
the foreign exchange market during the observation period, we will have to first 
construct an index of central bank exchange market intervention by borrowing 
relevant concepts originally introduced by the seminal work of Girton-Roper (1977).  
To trace how volatilities of each component of the intervention index evolve 
overtime, we apply the Markov-Switching ARCH (SWARCH) procedure. This 
empirical approach significantly departs from previous works that have also 
attempted to construct measures of indices of intervention (see for instance: 
                                                 
1 In view of this, the IMF moved to a de-facto classification in 1999, and aimed to describe 
what member countries actually do rather than what they say that they do (Genberg and 
Swoboda (2004)). 
 
2 Refer to section 2 on the Literature Reviews.   6
Weymark (1997) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998)). Unlike the traditional ARCH 
model, the SWARCH model can successfully capture the structural shift in the data 
without the need to distinguish or create arbitrarily sub-samples (for instance the pre-
1997 financial crisis period and the post-1997 period). Furthermore, for the 
intervention index we employ the smoothed probabilities of the conditional variances 
instead. This helps us to avoid the problem with using a parametric measure of 
volatility such as variance or standard deviation where these measures are prone to 
outliers and structural breaks. 
Once we have generated the intervention index for each country case, the 
next task is to calculate regime thresholds for each currency. The idea here is to 
estimate a threshold where we can systematically categorize a regime characterized 
by excessive intervention activities of the monetary authority and separate it from that 
of low exchange market intervention regime. Given potential diversities between the 
behaviours of the four currencies and the activities of the monetary authorities of 
these countries, it is imperative that we avoid imposing a “common regional set” of 
thresholds for all currencies.  
Due to the non-normality of the statistical distribution of the intervention index 
series, we have to avoid relying on parametric assumptions in identifying the 
threshold levels. Accordingly, our study will apply the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) 
and adopt a modified estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Palm 
(2001) ---henceforth HKKP. The application of HKKP enables us to generate more 
consistent analyses even with relatively small sample sizes.    
Given the construction of the intervention index and the carefully done 
statistical classification of the regimes, a number of insightful and relevant policy 
concerns can be addressed by the paper. Instead of just asking whether these crisis-
effected countries in East Asia have moved to a more flexible regime during the post-
1997 period, more important questions that can be posed are: has the shift from a 
rigid policy to a flexible one been a “voluntary” policy decision? Or, has it mostly been   7
driven by the strong market pressures on the local currency which potentially could 
result in a very expensive cost toward managing a fairly rigid exchange rate regime? 
These two questions are clearly important and crucial research questions, which we 
find, until now, hardly any study has systematically tried to address
3.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. A brief overview of the literature will be 
presented in section 2. The next section discusses the basic concepts behind the 
construction of the intervention index. The two key empirical tools, namely, the 
SWARCH and the EVT, are briefly introduced in section 4. Data and empirical test 
results are presented in section 5. Based on the findings reported in section 5, we 
evaluate the exchange regimes of the four East Asian economies in section 6. A brief 
concluding section ends the paper.  
 
2. Literature  Reviews 
Previous studies that have examined the actual or de-facto exchange rate 
arrangements in place in most of the countries in East Asia have proceeded in two 
ways. One approach is to test if the countries assigned weights either to a specific 
currency or to a basket of currencies using a simple regression model. Originally 
developed and applied by Frankel and Wei in a series of studies (1993, 1994, 1995), 













t u e e e e e e + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β α       (1) 
where 
j
t e ∆  is the monthly change in the log exchange rate of currency j in month t, α 
is a constant term, βk (k = 1, 2, .., 5) is the coefficient on the monthly change in the 
log exchange rate of currency k, and ut is the residual term. The superscripts USD, 
DM, JY, FF, and UKP refer to the dollar, the deutschemark, the yen, the French 
                                                 
3 See also, for instance, (Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)) that posed a research question similar 
to the one above.    8
franc, and the U.K. pound, respectively.
4 All exchange rates are expressed in terms 
of a certain numeraire currency, usually the Swiss franc.  
The intuition behind the model is that the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as the weights assigned by the respective authorities to the 
corresponding currencies in their exchange rate policies (Kawai and Akiyama, 2000). 
In doing so, one can then identify to which specific currency or to a basket of 
currencies that monetary authorities have tended to stabilise their exchange rates.  
  The Frankel-Wei model does not come without its criticisms. First, McCauley 
(2001) pointed out that the high estimated coefficients (weights) for the U.S. dollar 
does not follow that these currencies were pegging to the U.S. dollar. The conclusion 
that does follow is that the East Asian currencies belong and remain to the U.S. 
dollar bloc, “or at least that they have not slipped from the dollar bloc into the euro 
bloc” (McCauley, p. 47). McCauley’s basis for this distinction between bloc 
membership and de-facto pegging (the latter being the preferred interpretation of 
McKinnon and among others) is that “currencies can float freely and yet belong to a 
bloc” (p.46). The paper further argues that “if belonging to the dollar bloc is taken to 
be the same as being pegged to the dollar, then the Canadian and Australian dollars 
must be considered pegged to the U.S. dollar” (p. 46). 
   The second criticism has something to do with the choice of the numeraire 
currency. The problem with this empirical strategy is that the numeraire currency 
should not be linked to any of the currencies in the basket (Benassy-Quere and 
Coeure, 2000)
5. For instance in Equation 1, the Swiss franc, as the numeraire 
currency, is linked to the DM/euro and the U.S. dollar.            
                                                 
4 Alternatively, in order to assess the roles of the tripolar currencies (U.S. dollar, Japanese 
yen, and the euro) in East Asian exchange rates, the deutschemark (DM), French franc (FF), 
and the U.K. pound (UKP), can be collectively replaced in the right-hand side of the equation 
by the euro.  
5 In one of the earlier Frankel-Wei (1995) paper, they also used the Swiss franc as the 
numeraire, but this was all right as they only had the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen as the 
exogenous variables.    9
The other alternative approach is to assess the degree of commitment by 
countries to exchange rate stabilisation by arriving at a statistical descriptive measure 
of observed volatilities in exchange rates, stock of foreign exchange reserves and 
interest rates. The basic idea behind this approach is that exchange rate stabilisation 
is not observed through movements alone (or the lack of it) in the nominal exchange 
rate, but also through interventions in the foreign exchange market and monetary 
policy actions which moderate or suppressed supposed movements in the nominal 
exchange rate. There is a scant of studies (e.g., Baig (2001) and Hernandez and 
Montiel (2003)) that have directly used this approach.
6 However, the two studies also 
have their own limitations.  
First, these studies used as their measurements of volatility, the standard 
deviation, which is the commonly used parametric measure of volatility. However, 
any standard deviation measure is a form of averaging and is only as appropriate 
with the underlying conformity of the data to a conventional parametric assumption of 
normal distribution needed to employ such a method.
7 In fact, as early as the 1960s, 
the non-normality of any speculative price series such as the exchange rate and the 
interest rates has already been clearly recognised.
8  
Second, it is customary practice of these studies to compare the observed 
volatility outcomes of the East Asian countries’ exchange rates, stock of foreign 
exchange reserves, and interest rates across a benchmark or comparator set of 
acknowledged ‘clean’ floaters, which are also mostly developed countries with more 
advanced and well-developed financial markets. However, this approach rests on the 
                                                 
6 McKinnon and Schnabl (2002) can also be added to these two studies, however, they only 
looked at exchange rate volatility. 
7 Hernandez and Montiel (2003) used, aside from the standard deviation, the range and mean 
absolute change of the respective changes in exchange rate, stock of foreign exchange 
reserves and interest rate, while, Baig (2001) used only the standard deviation of the changes 
of the same three series.   
8 See, for example, the collection of papers by Mandelbrot (1963, 1964, 1967), Fama (1965, 
1970) among others.   10
strong implicit assumption that the shocks experienced by all these countries were 
uniform over time and across countries, which may not most likely to be the case.
9     
As will be elaborated further in the next section, our approach will also involve 
examining three key indicators, namely the foreign exchange reserve, the interest 
rate, and the nominal exchange rate. Instead of looking at those indicators 
individually however, we will employ them to construct an intervention index of the 
central bank for each individual country case. Then, a number of empirical 
methodologies will be applied to address the shortcomings of previous studies.         
 
3. Intervention  Index 
In their seminal work, Girton-Roper (1977) show that any excess demand for 
foreign exchange can be fulfilled through non-mutually exclusive conduits. If market 
pressures on a particular currency, or often referred to as speculative pressures, 
have successfully targeted a currency, then there would likely be a sharp 
depreciation of the domestic currency. However, at other times, the attack can be 
repelled or warded off through raising interest rates and/or running down on the 
foreign exchange reserves.  
Therefore, volatility alone in the nominal exchange rate understates the 
magnitude of speculative attacks as this excludes episodes of unsuccessful attacks. 
Government policies manifested through interest rate policy actions in the money 
market and purchase or sell of international reserves in the foreign exchange market, 
moderate supposed large movements in exchange rates. In the same manner, 
considering in isolation, movements in reserves and interest rate aside from 
exchange rates also offer only a partial view of the severity of shocks in the 
economy.  
                                                 
9 Nonetheless, this argument was also recognized by Hernandez and Montiel. In cases, 
where the said assumption appears not to hold, they also examined the relative volatilities of 
the three variables (exchange rates, foreign exchange reserves, and interest rates). They 
believe that, in principle, by looking at their relative volatilities it will be independent of the 
environment (p. 345).        11
Based on that seminal idea of Girton-Roper (1977), we can generate two sets 
of measures or proxies. First, by combining the information gathered from the foreign 
exchange reserve position of the central bank and its key policy interest rate, one can 
generate a measure of the monetary authority’s propensity to intervene and manage 
the fluctuations of the local currency. Second, we can also add the information on the 
exchange rate fluctuations of the local currency to the monetary authority’s 
intervention objectives in order to construct a reasonable estimate of the extent of 
currency attacks on the market, or commonly referred to as the index of exchange 
market pressure (EMP).
10    
It is important to note however that the definition of  EMP in our study is more 
closely in line with that of Weymark (1997), whereby the exchange market pressure 
measures the total excess demand for the domestic currency in the international 
market as the exchange rate change that would have been required to remove the 
excess demand in the absence of market intervention by the monetary authority. 
Girton-Ropter (1977) instead defines its EMP as a measure of excess demand for 
money in the domestic money market, hence focusing solely on pressures arising 
from the domestic economy. 
To construct the intervention index, we first estimate the “smoothed” 
probabilities of each key indicator (interest rate, reserve, and exchange rate) to be in 
the high-volatility state by adopting the markov-regime switching ARCH (as will be 
elaborated further in the next section). A large (small) value for the smoothed 
probability of high-volatilty state of the exchange rate at time t, for instance, suggests 
that there is a high (low) probability that the exchange rate is volatile during that 
specific period (t). As will be discussed further, this is a useful measure as it conveys 
information about the nature of the market and the policy stance.   
                                                 
10  This general idea of exchange market pressure index has been well developed by early 
studies such as Eichengreen, B., Rose, A., and Wyplosz (1995), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
Reinhart (1998) and Weymark (1998).    12
Next, taking the ratio of the smoothed probabilities of high volatility state of 
the monetary authority intervention and the exchange market pressure, we arrive at 
the intervention index of the monetary authority (Equation 2): 
 

























exr p p p int , , are the smoothed probabilities that the conditional variance 
of the changes in exchange rate, reserves, and interest rates, respectively, are in a 






exr p p p int + + ) is interpreted 
as the smoothed probability of a high exchange market pressure on the currency. It 
captures the probability of the ‘total’ pressure place upon by market shocks on the 
exchange rate, and is given as the sum of the smoothed probabilities of the high 
variability in exchange rate (
H
exr p ) and the smoothed probabilities of the high 





reserves p p int + ) (Glick and Wihlbourg, 1997).  
In the absence of publicly available information on intervention in the foreign 
exchange market, we follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in using changes in reserves 
as the imperfect measure of foreign exchange intervention, while intervention in 
money markets is measured by changes in interest rates.
11 These indicators are 
imperfect measure as we recognize that not all movements or changes in reserve or 
interest rate are due to or associated with interventions to defend or smooth the 
fluctuations of the local currency.  
                                                 
11 As will be discussed in section 5, line 11 of the IMF-IFS is used as the measure of the stock 
of foreign exchange reserves instead of line 1Ld (international reserves data). The advantage 
of using line 11 is that it includes borrowed money, which can be used for foreign exchange 
intervention, while, line 1Ld may change due to a host of other reasons not entirely connected 
to intervention such as, fluctuations in valuations, accrual of interest earnings, and money in 
the IMF that can or cannot be used. We thank Charles Wyplosz for pointing this out.    
    13
Our INTV index denotes that when analysing exchange rate policy, examining 
alone the behaviour of the exchange rate offers us a partial picture, as exchange rate 
volatility can be low because of government policy actions manifested through 




reserves p p int + , or 







exr p p p int + + . Thus, at the minimum, to produce an appropriate description 
of a country’s exchange rate policy, we need to look both at the information conveyed 
by exchange rate changes and intervention (Willett, 2004). As will be shown in the 
empirical section, the INTV index is in fact constrained between 0 and 1. An INTV 
index closes to one (zero) should suggest that there is a high (low) propensity to 
intervene, and thus suggesting a rigid (flexible) exchange rate regime. To be noted 
here, that our INTV index focuses on the degree of flexibility or rigidity of the regime, 
but it does not necessarily convey any discussion on the policy direction of the 
intervention: i.e. “leaning against or with the wind”.  
There are a number of advantages of adopting the INTV index. First, the 
inclusion of the interest rate variable in the INTV index extends earlier models, such 
as that of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) and Weymark (1997).  Given the 
importance and the evidence of frequent use of interest rate adjustments to defend 
the local currency, most especially during times of heavy market pressures against 
the local currency, it is vital that we include this policy instrument in our INTV index.
12  
Second, early studies constructed their indices of exchange market pressure 
and intervention index by including actual percentage changes of the key relevant 
variables. Since the volatility of one variable may potentially completely dominate the 
others, for instance the monthly changes in the exchange rate could double during 
the crisis period, early indices place a strong emphasis on the weights of the three 
                                                 
12  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) did not include the interest rate component in their 
application due to the lack of complete interest data for the countries that they examined. 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), on the other hand, include the level of domestic 
interest rate in their index of exchange market pressure.   14
variables/ components of the index. Each of the previous studies has a slightly 
different set of weighting schemes. Our INTV index relies on the probability of each 
variable to be in its high volatile state. The probability of each series is equally 
ranged from 0 to 1 at any point of time, including the crisis period. Hence, the INTV 
index is simpler to construct since it does not need to rely on any arbitrary weighting 
scheme. 
Thirdly, the application of time-varying smoothed probabilities of the markov-
regime switching ARCH means that our index does not require a priori dating of 
crisis, speculative attack periods or the abrupt shift from one type of exchange rate 
regime to another. The dynamics of the smoothed probabilities of each variable 
means that the INTV index will endogenously capture the trends and signal the 
timing of the following (if any): a significant rise in the market pressure (i.e. the 
speculative attack periods); a rise in the intervention activities of the monetary 
authority; and more importantly a shift to a different regime of exchange rate (if 
indeed there is one).       
Lastly, given the construction of the INTV index, different possible scenarios 
on the regime classifications can be conveniently derived, as will be shown in the 
empirical section of the paper. In the next section, however, we will first briefly 
discuss the two key econometric /statistical tools adopted in this study. 
 
4.  SWARCH and Extreme Value Theory 
4.1  Markov-Regime Switching ARCH (SWARCH) 
  Hamilton and Susmel (1994) proposed an extension of the standard ARCH 
model which can incorporate regime shifts. In their model, the parameters of the 
ARCH process are allowed to switch between discrete number of states, with the 
transitions between states governed by a finite-order Markov process. Hamilton and 
Susmel called this the switching ARCH or, simply, SWARCH model. The SWARCH 
model can be described by the following system of equations:   15
, 1 1 0 t t t r r ε φ φ + ∆ + = ∆ −   t ε  ) , 0 ( ~ 1 t t h N I −            (3) 
) ( t t t s g u = ε     K s ,...., 1 =                                       (4) 










2 α α σ                                                            (6) 
  Equation (3) assumes that the return  ) ( t r follows a first-order autoregressive 
scheme. The returns innovations ( ) t ε  are assumed to follow an ARCH process with 
conditional variance 
2
t σ  where 
2
t σ  depends linearly on q past squared errors, i.e., 
2
i t u − . In standard ARCH models, the parameters are constant across regimes. In the 
SWARCH model, however, the ARCH parameters are allowed to switch 
endogenously between a set of discrete states  ) (K . The move from one state to 
another represents a change in the scale of the volatility process. This is represented 
above by g(st) as the constant switching or variance factor, which depends on the 
state variable,  K st ,...., 1 = . In this representation, a normalization is imposed such 
that  1 ) 1 ( = g  and  1 ) ( ≥ t s g for  K st ,...., 1 = . Hence, State 1 may be viewed as the low 
volatility state. For  1 ≠ t s ,  ) ( t s g therefore indicates the magnitude of volatility at 
t s relative to the low volatility state.   
  Following Hamilton and Susmel (1994),  t s is assumed to follow an 
unobserved first-order K-Markov process, which can be described by transition 
probabilities,  . ) / ( 1 ij t t p i s j s P = = = − Each probability number, ( ) ij p , is the probability 
that State i is followed by State  j . For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed here 
that there are only two volatility states: low volatility (State 1) and high volatility state 
(State 2). Hence, for the two state case, the transition probabilities are: 
p[st = 1st-1 = 1] = p   16
p[st = 2st-1 = 1] = 1 ￿ p      ( 7 )  
p[st = 2st-1 = 2] = q 
p[st = 1st-1 = 2] =  1- q 
  One of the objectives of the SWARCH model is to predict the probability of 
occurrence of a state for each period, where it was shown by Hamilton and Susmel 
(1994) to be a by-product of a non-linear Markov-switching filter. For example, the 
inference that is based on information available or observed at time  ) (t is called the 
‘filter probability’. Alternatively, the inference using all sample observations is called 
the ‘smoothed probability’. The full sample smoothed probability represents the 
probability that the conditional variance was in state  t s  at date  ) (t , given all sample 
of observations. Since the basis for the construction of the INTV index (Equation 2) is 
expressed through the smoothed probabilities of the conditional variance being at 
State 2 (the high-volatility state), the index is in effect constrained between 0 and 1.  
 
4.2  Intervention Threshold: Application of Extreme Value Theory 
  The next empirical challenge is to compare and contrast the pre-1997 
exchange regime with that of the post-1997 regime. The challenge here is to 
calculate the levels of INTV index that can be considered as High and Low INTV, 
suggesting less and more flexible exchange rate regimes, respectively. Without 
properly generating thresholds of High and Low levels of INTV index, the 
classification of the regimes based on the intervention index will be done in an ad-
hoc manner.  
The conventional approach of generating these thresholds is by simply 
employing the mean and the standard deviations of the INTV index. Studies such as 
Baig (2001) and Hernandez and Montiel (2003) employed thresholds using the mean 
and standard deviations in their own definition of an INTV index. Moreover, early 
studies such as Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and   17
Reinhart (1998) also apply the mean and standard deviation measures to examine 
thresholds for the index of exchange market pressure. One principal assumption that 
must hold for the use of the mean and standard deviation to be appropriate is that the 
relevant series are normally distributed. However, as earlier mentioned, studies have 
shown that exchange rates, interest rates and foreign exchange reserves are not 
normally distributed.
13   
To generate thresholds that are statistically consistent with the underlying 
INTV series, we adopt the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approach. Given the 
relatively small observation size that we have for this study, we apply the modified tail 
index estimator proposed by Huisman, Koedijk, Kool, and Palm (2001) ---henceforth 
HKKP---, which is unbiased in small sample cases. The HKKP methodology starts 
with the Hill (1975) estimator: 









− − + − = ∑
=
γ     (8) 
 where: we assume that there is a sample of n positive independent observations 
drawn from some unknown fat-tailed distribution. Let the parameter γ  be the tail-
index of the distribution, and  ) (i x  be the ith-order statistic such that  ) ( ) 1 ( i x i x ≤ −  
for  . ,......, 2 n i =   k  is the pre-specified number of tail observations. Note by ordering 
the observation by its size and not by the original dates, the sample observations are 
arguably becoming independently distributed. Naturally, the choice of k  is crucial to 
obtain an unbiased estimate of the tail-index. 
  HKKP (2001) shows that for a general class of distribution functions the 
asymptotic expected value of the conventional hill estimator to be biased and 
increasing monotonically with k . Similarly, the asymptotic variance of the Hill 
                                                 
13 Refer to Footnote 7 and Pontines and Siregar (2005).   18









 Generally, this problem will only be resolved 
when the sample size goes to infinity for given k . 
  For our small sample observations, HKKP (2001) introduces an estimator that 
overcomes the problem of the need to select a “single” optimal k  in small sample 
observations. HKKP (2001) proposes that for values of k  smaller than some 
threshold value κ , the bias of the conventional Hill estimate of γ  increases almost 
linearly in k  and can be approximated by: 
) ( ) ( 1 0 k k k ε β β γ + + = ,   κ ,...., 2 , 1 = k     ( 9 )  
where:  0 β and  1 β  are the intercept and the estimate coefficient.  ) (k ε is a disturbance 
term.  HKKP (2001) also shows that the modified Hill estimator is quite robust with 








. Accordingly, for our empirics, we propose to 









Given our need to calculate the “high” and “low” thresholds of INTV index, our 
choice of κ  for the high threshold will contain the high or large observations of γ , 
associated with the large/high INTV index. Conversely, the low threshold will be the 
group of observation with the lower set of γ . 
  To estimate Equation (9), HKKP (2001) adopted the Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS), instead of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), to deal with the potential 
heteroscedasticity in the error term  )) ( ( k ε of Equation (9). The weight has 
( ) k ,...... 2 , 1  as diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere. The estimate of γ from 
the WLS regression is an approximately unbiased estimate of the tail-index.  
 
5. Empirics 
5.1 Data   19
  The data consist of monthly time series of nominal exchange rate expressed 
in local currency per U.S. dollar, overnight money market rates as the measure of 
domestic interest rates, and foreign assets of monetary authorities as the measure of 
foreign exchange reserves for Indonesia, Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The 
sample covers the period from January 1985 to December 2003. The data were 
gathered from the IMF International Financial Statistics. In Table 3, summary 
statistics are presented for the monthly percentage changes of exchange rates and 
foreign exchange reserves, and first-differences of the interest rates. As discussed 
before, the changes in reserve and interest rate are only imperfect measures of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market and money market, respectively. 
In addition, Table 3 also contains information on the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness coefficient, kurtosis coefficient, Jarque-Bera normality test (JB), 
and Ljung-Box (LB) test. All three series for the four countries show non-normality 
(note the JB test results), and the kurtosis coefficient indicates fat-tailedness, which 
is also behind the rejection of normality. The Ljung-Box (LB) statistics suggest 
significant autocorrelation with the exceptions of Indonesia (reserves) and Korea 
(reserves). The Ljung-Box (LBS) statistics, for the squared levels, are also significant, 
with the exceptions of Indonesia (exchange rate, reserves), Korea (exchange rate) 
and Singapore (reserves). This is largely taken as evidence for an ARCH-type 
process for the conditional variance.  
 
5.2  SWARCH Test Results and INTV Index 
Next we proceed in using the (SWARCH) model of Hamilton and Susmel 
(1994) and the results of the SWARCH model for each of the three series for the 
individual countries are shown in Tables 4-6. A number of interesting results can be 
noted from the tables. First, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant with 
the exceptions of the Singapore dollar and reserves () 1 α  (Tables 4 and 5). Second,   20
the estimated transition probabilities, i.e.,  11 p  and  22 p , are statistically significant 
and are close to one. These estimates imply that the states are highly persistent. 
More specifically, from the estimates, one can compute for the expected duration of 






− ii p 1
1
. For example, state 1 (the low volatility state) for the 
Indonesian rupiah in Table 4 is expected to last on average for (1 – 0.95)
-1 = 20 
months, while state 2 (the high volatility state) can be expected to last on average for 
14 months.  
Third, the estimated switching parameters (the variance factors), () t s g , are 
significantly different than one in all series. That is, for each of the three individual 
series and for each of the five countries, it is possible to distinguish a ‘low’ and a 
‘high’ volatility state. Taking again the example of the Indonesian rupiah in Table 4, 
the second state is 787 times more volatile than state 1. The magnitude of this 
difference alone for the case of the Indonesian rupiah and for the rest of the results of 
the switching parameters in Tables 4-6 underscores the need for a model of 
conditional variance that allows for regime switches. Fourth, conventional likelihood 
ratio test suggest that the null hypothesis of no regime switching can, indeed, be 
rejected. For example, the estimated SWARCH(2,2) in the case of the Indonesian 
rupiah in Table 4 would have as its nested model an ARCH(2). The usual likelihood 
ratio test is then computed as:  –2(292.67 – 599.83) = 614.32, which rejects the 
ARCH(2) model in favour of the SWARCH model.
14 Finally, as a diagnostic test, 
Ljung-Box Q-statistics were tested for the standardised residuals, LB(24), and for the 
squared standardised residuals, LBS(24). Noticed that by using the SWARCH model, 
evidence of autocorrelation were either clearly reduced or eliminated.   
                                                 
14 A word of caution is necessary in interpreting this result. In Markov switching models, the 
usual regularity conditions justifying the use of classical tests such as the likelihood ratio test 
are violated. This is because, under the null hypothesis of only one state, the transition 
probabilities are not identified, implying that the sample likelihood function is flat with respect 
to these parameters. As in Hamilton and Susmel (1994), the likelihood ratio test results 
mentioned here should be treated more as a descriptive summary than formal statistical tests.   21
 
5.3  The EVT Thresholds and the Scenarios 
Based on the SWARCH test results, we can compute the estimated 
probabilities of high variability in exchange rate, reserve and interest rate during the 
observation period. From these estimated probabilities (Figures 1-4), the intervention 
(INTV) index can be accordingly constructed for each country (Figures 1b-4b). As 
discussed, a high INTV (i.e. close to one) implies a high propensity to intervene and 
thus a rigid exchange rate regime. However, the question now is at what level of 
INTV index can be considered as high (or low).  
Employing the concept of the extreme value theory discussed earlier, we are 
able to calculate the “extreme maximum and minimum” of the INTV index for each 
country. From the set of high extreme values selected we pick the smallest one. The 
numbers in Table 7 suggest that the threshold for a high INTV index is at least 
around 90 percent for Indonesia, 91 percent for Korea, 98 percent for Singapore and 
close to 99 percent for Thailand. In addition, from the set of minimum extreme 
values, we pick the highest level. The threshold for a low INTV index is found to be 
around 15 percent for Thailand and Korea, 18 percent for Indonesia and 89 percent 
for Singapore. The wide ranges of thresholds, especially in the low thresholds, 
underscore the importance of imposing individual thresholds, instead of introducing a 
regional threshold in an ad-hoc manner. As will be elaborated further in the next 
section, the small gap between the maximum and minimum thresholds and the 
considerably high value of the minimum threshold for Singapore dollar clearly 
suggests that the currency had in general been under a rigid exchange rate policy. 
Based on these classifications, a set of possible scenarios may emerge from 
the High and Low INTV classifications. 
(a). Scenario #1: High and Successful Intervention Efforts. A high () INTV  




reserves p p int + , leads to a stable local currency   22
(low ()
H
exr p ). Here, we can conclusively argue that there is an attempt by the 
monetary authority to intervene and offset ‘market forces’ and hence, successfully 
keeping a limited exchange rate flexibility. 











exr p p p int + + . Under this circumstance, it is hardly 
anything conclusive that can be argued about the commitment of the monetary 
authority. The situation may prevail when for instance there is no significant shock in 
the foreign exchange market, and also no significant activities taken by the monetary 




reserves p p int + , 
or the lack of intervention policies, occurs because there is no need to intervene due 






exr p p p int + + .  











exr p p p int + + , we can confidently conclude that 
the monetary authority is not adopting a rigid exchange rate policy. However, we 
have to add a caveat here. Under few circumstances, we may not be able to 
conclusively assert that the central bank has voluntarily adopted the policy stance. 
For instance, under the situation when there is a high probability of a very volatile 
local currency and a low probability of a successful exchange market intervention, 
the policy maker may reluctantly keep their foreign exchange market intervention 
activities to a minimum level, and thus avoiding the high cost of intervention. Hence, 
we need to carefully examine the probabilities of each component of the index to 
squeeze as much as information about the natures of the market and the monetary 
policy stance.   
(d). Scenario #4. In addition to the earlier three possibilities, we can also add 
one more Scenario to be called as the period of high foreign exchange market 
pressures where the currency crises periods are included as well. Under this   23
scenario, the INTV index is going to fall between the low and the high 
ranges,() Low INTV High > > . This situation appears when at least two of the three 






exr p p p int , , are relatively high. During the crisis 
period, the monetary authorities are often found to be very active in trying to keep the 




reserves p p int + ). However, the attacks on the local 
currency are very severe, reflected by the persistently volatile exchange rate ---
high()
H
exr p , hence keeping the INTV index between the low and the high ranges. 
 
6.  Evaluating the Exchange Rate Regime 
6.1 Indonesia 
  The persistently high () INTV index, well above (0.90), from 1991 to1995, 
seems to suggest that the monetary authority had adopted an active intervention 
strategy to keep rupiah stable (Figures 1 and 1b, and Table 8). However, when we 
decompose the Intervention index into its three key components, it becomes less 
definite what one can conclude for most part of that period. With the exception of 
1991 with the relatively high levels of ()
H
r pint  and  ()
H
reserves p , the rest of the period saw 
very little evidences of interventions, either via the foreign exchange reserve or the 
interest rate policy. That is we find the characteristics of Scenario #2. 
  We do know however that all the way until 1995, the intervention spread for 
the rupiah of Bank Indonesia was only 3 percent at the most from the central parity, 
suggesting a fairly rigid exchange rate regime adopted by the monetary authority 
during this period. Hence we can conclude that up to 1995, the exchange rate policy 
in Indonesia has largely been a rigid one. However, from 1992 to 1995 in particular, 
the market pressure against the rupiah has largely been moderate, and thus 
requiring little intervention policies by Bank Indonesia (the central bank).   24
Since 1996, rupiah has undoubtedly become more volatile. The intervention 
spread band was widened three times in that year, from 3 percent in December 1995 
to 5 percent in June 1996, and to 8 percent in September 1996 (Djiwandono (2000)). 
The central bank allowed rupiah to move more freely again in July 1997 by further 
extending the intervention band to 12 percent. During the period of January 1998 
until December 1998, Indonesian went through the worst stage of the 1997 East 
Asian financial and currency crises. The () INTV  averaged around (0.67), with each 






exr p p p int , , , was extremely high, 
anywhere between (0.96) and (0.99).  We classify this condition as the Crisis 





reserves p p int + , the domestic currency continued to be very volatile. The 
Crisis Scenario in fact continued until 1999, where rupiah remained volatile despite 
the active intervention policies in both the foreign exchange market (reserve) and the 
money market (the interest rate). 
The clear evidence of a shift to a more flexible policy (Scenario #3) can be 
detected since 2000, with the () INTV  index hovering around 10 percent (except for 
2001). Despite the persistently high smoothed probability of rupiah, intervention 
activities of the central bank were kept to significantly less than their efforts in 
previous years, but still at a rather moderate average rate of intervention activities in 
2001 and 2002. The evidences seem to capture initial moves to a more flexible rate, 
but one cannot conclude that the monetary authority has voluntarily fully adopted the 
new regime. Moreover, political uncertainty was arguably the primary underlying 
cause of selling pressures against the rupiah in 2001 and early 2002 (Siregar and 
Pontines (2005)). No evidence of market interventions is reported only in 2003 (Table 
8).   
In general, our findings are consistent with a number of early studies, in 
particular those of Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) and Kim, Kim and Wang (2004).   25
For instance, Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) classified the exchange rate regime in 
Indonesia for the period of 1999 to early 2001 as an independent float. The IMF 
defines an independent float as an arrangement where “the exchange rate is market-
determined, with any foreign exchange intervention aimed at moderating the rate of 
change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than 
establishing a level for it”. Whereas, from April 2001 until end of 2003, Indonesia is 
classified as “managed floating” (Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002)). However, the 
distinction between an independent float and a managed float according to the IMF 




  Looking at Table 9 and Figures 2 and 2b, the high smoothed probability for 
interest rate component of the INTV index for the period from January 1990 to July 
1994 suggests that the monetary policy authority had always been active in the 
money market in managing the won. The role of interest rate policy was very 
dominant during this period, as suggested by the high ()
H
r pint . Starting in 1990, the 
monetary authority in Korea also adopted the so-called market-average system 
(MARS) where the won/U.S. dollar nominal exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate 
within a specified band of the basic rate which was revised daily (Dornbusch and 
Park (1999)). When this system was first introduced, the won/U.S. dollar was allowed 
to vary within a very narrow ±  0.4 percent of the basic rate. In the mid-1990s, the 
band was widened to ± 2.25 percent. With the INTV index averaging around 99 
percent level and the average smoothed probability of the won around 0 percent, the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) was indeed successful in tightly managing the won rate against 
the US dollar during the early to mid-1990s.  
                                                 
15  The IMF defines a managed float as “the authorities influence exchange rate arrangements 
through interventions to counter the long-term trend of the exchange rate, without specifying a 
predetermined path, or without having a specific exchange rate target.  
   26
  Starting in 1995, the won had become significantly more volatile, despite the 
continued effort of the monetary authority to manage it by actively adjusting the 
interest rate. On November 20
th, 1997, clearly feeling the rising pressures of the early 
stages of the 1997 East Asia currency crisis, widened the MARS band to about ± 10 
percent. In addition to the interest rate policy, BOK began to actively conduct open 
market operation by selling its foreign exchange reserve. From a persistently low 
level up to 1996, the smoothed probability of the reserve ()
H
reserves p   jumped 
significantly in 1997 to around 46 percent. The band was finally abolished on the 16
th 
of December 1997, when Korea was officially in a crisis. We would categorize 1996 
and 1997 under Scenario #4. 
At the height of the crisis, January 1998 until December 1998, the () INTV  





exr p p int , , were extremely high between (0.99) to (1.00). It also became obvious 
that the monetary authority had started to directly intervene in the foreign exchange 
market, as suggested by a significant rise in the smoothed probability of reserves 
from around (0.06) for the period of July 1995-July 1997 to about (0.55) for the period 
of January 1998 to December 1998. The levels of the smoothed probabilities for all 
three components of the INTV index are consistent with the Crisis Scenario 
(Scenario #4).  
In 1999, Korea began the recovery process, and returned to a more stable 
macroeconomic environment. Despite the presence of persistently high volatility in 
the foreign exchange market () 99 >
H
exr p , the intervention of the BOK was clearly 
reduced as compared from the levels reported during 1996-1998. The() INTV  index 
is still close to 14 percent, driven mostly by ()
H
r pint . Based on the previous definitions 
of different regime scenarios, we would place this period as Scenario 3. However, we 
cannot still consider this period as the period of pure/ voluntary flexible regime, as the   27
BOK was still actively adjusting its interest rate policy to manage the money market 
and influence the fluctuations of the won in that year.  
The post-2000 exchange rate regime can clearly be characterized as the 
flexible / floating period with no evidences of government interventions reported from 
the smoothed probabilities ---low values for both ()
H
reserves p  and ()
H
r pint . The INTV 
index was averaging less than 1 percent, while clearly the won continued to remain 
very volatile during the period of January 2000 – December 2003. This leads us to 
conclude that Korea has voluntarily moved to a de-facto flexible regime (Scenario 
#3). Annual Report publication of the BOK from 2000 to 2003 describes its exchange 
rate regime to the effect that while it stands ready to undertake appropriate measures 
to avoid abrupt fluctuations in its exchange rate, the won, in principle, is allowed to 
fluctuate freely according to its demand and supply in the foreign exchange market.      
 
6.3 Singapore 
  It is clear from these statistics that the rigid management of the exchange rate 
policy continued to be the centrepiece of the monetary policy in the country until 
2003. With the exception of the crisis period of 1997-1998 and 2001, the INTV index 
for Singapore was persistently well above 90 percent and remained very close to 98 
percent “high-threshold” for a number of years (Table 10 and Figures 3 and 3b). 
These statistics are consistent with a number of official reports and studies 
conducted at Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), which all suggest that the MAS 
periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market with the extent of the foreign 
exchange intervention determined by the exchange rate target bounded by an 
undisclosed band (MAS 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2003).   
  From the average smoothed probabilities posted in Table 10, we can also 
construe that the MAS actively employed both the reserve and the interest rate policy 
to manage the exchange rate of the local currency for the large part of the past two   28
decades. It is also interesting to note here that during the pre-1997 financial crisis, 
the interest rate was the main instrument of the monetary authority, reflected by the 
high smoothed probability. A different practice emerged from January 2000 to 
December 2003. During this period, the reserve has clearly become the primary 
instrument to manage the Singapore dollar to maintain the rigid exchange rate policy. 
To illustrate this point, between 2000 to 2003, the foreign exchange reserve of the 
country (minus gold) has increased by about US$15 billion to reach a total of around 
US$95 billion in 2003.     
  
6.4 Thailand 
  In general, our test results suggest that the case of Thailand is very similar to 
that of Korea, where there has indeed been a de-facto shift from a rigid exchange 
policy (Scenario 1) during the pre-1997 period to a high-degree of floating / flexible 
regime (Scenario 3) during the post-1999 period. The average INTV index dropped 
from a level close to 100 percent from 1991 to 1996 to an average of less than 5 
percent for the period from 1999 to 2003.    
Another similarity can be found on the importance of the interest rate policy, 
relative to reserves, in the management of a stable baht during the pre-1997 crisis 
period. For the period between 1991 and 1996, the smoothed probabilities (Figure 4 
and 4b and Table 11) of the interest rate ()
H
r pint  have been well over 99 percent, 
while the smoothed probabilities of the reserve ()
H
reserves p  were close to zero percent.  
From the empirical findings, we can also conclude that the exchange rate 
regime was under Scenario #4 (the Crisis case) during 1997 and 1998. Both years 
saw the full efforts of the central bank to defend the local currency by employing both 
an interest rate policy and the selling off of foreign exchange reserves. Despite the 
massive intervention efforts in 1997, as suggested by the high smoothed probabilities   29
of interest rate and reserve, the baht lost its value substantially against the US dollar 
and was very volatile.  
  
7.  Brief Concluding Remarks 
Frankel, et.al. (2001) nails it right at the very heart of the challenge when they 
argued that credibility and transparency are the core of the current debate about 
exchange rate regimes. Like many other papers in the past, they also emphasize the 
difficulties facing the efforts to verify the de-facto exchange rate regime being 
adopted by a country.   
This paper revisited the debate on the de-facto versus de-jure exchange rate 
regimes adopted by four countries in East Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand, 
Singapore and South-Korea. By constructing an intervention index of the monetary 
authorities of each country and carefully categorizing the threshold regimes, the 
study is able to conclusively conclude that, with the exception of Singapore, the other 
three economies have adopted a de-facto flexible exchange rate regime during the 
post-1997 period, in particular since 2000. 
As briefly mentioned, Indonesia, Thailand and South-Korea have officially 
announced their intentions to adopt the inflation targeting strategy as the anchor of 
their monetary policies during the post-1997 financial crisis. The move to focus on 
the fluctuations in the price level has allowed, as illustrated by our empirical 
evidences, the rupiah, the baht and the won to move more freely. The more flexible 
regime, as reflected by the less interventionist strategy of each central banks, should, 
in due course, help address  the global imbalance phenomenon discussed in the 
September 2005 WEO report of the IMF. 
Going back to the debate between the mercantilist view versus the 
precautionary view on rapid accumulation of international reserve, our findings, in   30
general, implicitly reject that of the mercantilist view.
16 There is no evidence of 
commitments by the monetary authorities of these three countries, namely Indonesia, 
Thailand and South-Korea, to either pursue a specific target of bilateral nominal 
exchange rate against the US dollar, or preserve an undervalued local currency 
against the US dollar by actively intervening in both foreign exchange and money 
markets in these countries since 2000.
17  
                                                 
16 Given the coverage of the paper, we cannot however make any general remarks on the 
precautionary view. 
 
17  This overall finding is, in general, consistent with the message conveyed in Aizenman and 
Lee (2005).  
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Table 1: 
Reserves as Proportion of Imports (months),  

















































































































































































































































































































      a) Ratio to average monthly imports of Merchandise goods; b) 
 Monthly 
average of total foreign exchange reserves minus gold. Source:  Rajan, R. Siregar, 
R, and Bird, G. (forthcoming).   37
Table 2: Summary of Findings of Studies (with exclusive focus on East Asia alone) 




Method(s) Indonesia  Korea  Singapore Thailand 










Gan Wee Beng 
(2000) 




Modified Version of 
Frankel-Wei 
Greater Flexibility  Greater Flexibility  Greater Flexibility  Greater Flexibility 
Baig (2001)  1999-2000  Standard Deviation 
and Frankel-Wei 
Inconclusive U.S.  Dollar-peg 
reversion 
Not Included  Increased Flexibility 









Ogawa (2001)  Various sub-periods 
















January 1, 1999 –  




U.S. dollar- peg 
reversion 
High-frequency 
U.S. dollar- peg 
reversion 
High-frequency 
U.S. dollar- peg 
reversion 
Kawai (2002)  1999-June 2002 
 





Standard Deviation  Managed Float  Managed Float  Not Included  Managed Float 
Fukuda and Ohno 
(2003) 
Various sub-periods 
from February 2, 






U.S. Dollar- peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar- peg 
reversion 
 
U.S. Dollar- peg 
reversion 
Kim, Kim, and 
Wang (2004) 
Two sample 



















   38
Table: 2 (cont’d) 
Summary of Findings of Studies (Non- exclusive focus on East Asia) 
Regarding the Post-crisis Exchange Rate Regimes In Some East Asian Countries 
 
  IMF Classification based on Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 




Managed Floating   Managed Floating  Managed Floating 










Singapore  Managed Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating 
Thailand  Managed Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating 
 
  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger Classification (2005) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 







Korea  Fix Fix  --------  --------  --------- 
Singapore  Fix Fix  --------  --------  --------- 
Thailand  Float Float -------  --------  --------- 
 
  Reinhart-Rogoff Classification (2004) 
 Indonesia  Korea  Singapore  Thailand 










  Freely Falling/Freely 
Floating 
Freely Floating  Freely Floating  Managed Floating  Managed Floating 
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Table 3:  
Univariate Statistics on Exchange Rates (EXR), Reserves, and Interest Rates (INT) 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  JB Normality 
Test 
LB(24) LBS(24) 
Indonesia              
EXR 1.202  8.723 6.563  68.593  42323.16
** 53.36
** 15.16 
Reserves 2.071  10.644  4.257  37.329  11831.79
** 30.15  11.36 




             
Korea             
EXR 0.214  3.606 8.573  105.007  101197.8
** 70.43
** 6.68 
Reserves 2.274  7.296  0.833  8.161  278.215
** 27.97 87.24
** 




             
Singapore             




Reserves 0.868  1.06  0.118  4.061  11.172
** 79.0
** 26.34 




             
Thailand             













Notes:  EXR and Reserves in percentage changes and INT in first-difference.  
            JB-normality test: Jarque-Bera test, which is distributed 
2
2 χ . 
   LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
   LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
   
**, 
* significant at the 1 and 5  percent level, respectively.   40
Table 4: 
2-state regime switching ARCH regressions for percentage changes in exchange rates   
 













φ 0  0.21
** (0.01)  -0.0003 (0.04)  -0.13
* (0.06)  -0.01 (0.04) 
φ 1  0.34
** (0.02)  0.58
** (0.06)  0.3
** (0.07)  0.24
** (0.07) 
α 0  0.01
** (0.002)  0.20
** (0.07)  0.64
** (0.10)  0.15
** (0.03) 
α 1  1.22
** (0.29)  0.58
** (0.25)  0.16 (0.12)  0.36
** (0.12) 
α 2  0.32
* (0.16)   ---  ---  0.3
** (0.11) 
p11 0.95
** (0.02)  0.99
** (0.006)   0.97
** (0.02)  0.99
** (0.008) 
p22 0.93
** (0.03)  0.99
** (0.006)  0.81
** (0.1)  0.97
** (0.03) 
g2 787.33
++(283.10)   19.92
++ (0.96) 9.69
++ (3.63)  64.15
++ (18.53) 
Log-likelihood -292.67  -316.7  -333.66  -316.04 
Log-likelihood  
(no regime switching) 
-599.83 -339.38  -353.77  -417.76 





df ---  3.61
** (0.96)  ---  --- 
LB(24) 7.27  27.49  15.92  11.75 
LBS(24) 0.22  31.73  9.25  0.31 
 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
  LR test: Likelihood ratio test which test the null hypothesis if no regime switching, which is distributed 
2
r χ . 
   LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
   LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
            
**, 
* significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  
            
++, 
+ significantly different than 1 at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  41
 
Table 5: 
2-state regime switching ARCH regressions for percentage changes in reserves   
 













φ 0  1.22
** (0.33)  1.68
** (0.33)  0.69
** (0.09)  1.34
** (0.19) 
φ 1          0.04  (0.07)  -0.04 (0.08)  0.20
** (0.07)  0.01 (0.06) 
α 0  13.91
** (2.4)  12.72
** (1.83)  0.58
** (0.10)  4.57
** (0.64) 
α 1  0.44
** (0.13)  0.2
* (0.1)  0.14 (0.10)  0.22
* (0.10) 
p11 0.97
** (0.02)  0.99
** (0.01)  0.98
** (0.03)  0.99
** (0.008) 
p22 0.85
** (0.09)  0.97
** (0.03)  0.95
** (0.06)  0.92
** (0.07) 
g2 18.19
++ (5.17)  9.01
++ (2.45)  3.09
+ (0.89)  24.17
+ (11.03) 




-816.97 -739.22  -325.86  -576.12 





LB(24) 30.04  21.88  43.3
** 42.43
** 
LBS(24) 34.19  26.66  22.72  13.29 
      
     Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
             LR test: Likelihood ratio test which test the null hypothesis if no regime switching, which is distributed 
2
r χ . 
    LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
    LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
             
**, 
* significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  
             
++, 
+ significantly different than 1 at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.   42
Table 6: 
2-state regime switching ARCH regressions for first-difference in interest rates   
 













φ 0  0.02 (0.07)  -0.001 (0.01)  0.0006 (0.01)  -0.04 (0.03) 
φ 1          -0.05  (0.06)  0.22
** (0.05)  0.08
** (0.02)  0.09 (0.07) 
α 0  0.82
** (0.19)  0.007
** (0.001)  0.006
** (0.002)  0.06
** (0.02) 
α 1  0.48
** (0.19)  0.38
** (0.11)  0.62
** (0.21)  0.63
** (0.22) 
α 2  --- ---  ---  0.24
* (0.11) 
p11 0.96
** (0.02)  0.91
** (0.03)  0.66
** (0.09)  0.99
** (0.01) 
p22 0.84
** (0.07)  0.95
** (0.02)  0.83
** (0.06)  0.92
** (0.01) 
g2 87.92
++ (25.06)  174.31
++ (42.48)  36.81
++ (10.08)  51.38
++ (18.12) 
 




-587.39 -338.49  -192.99  -423.63 





LB(24) 23.72  21.14  21.80  18.21 
LBS(24) 5.52  1.51  48.68
** 31.76 
 
  Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
  LR test: Likelihood ratio test which test the null hypothesis if no regime switching, which is distributed 
2
r χ . 
   LB(24):  Ljung-Box test for EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
   LBS(24): Ljung-Box test for squared of EXR, Reserves and INT with 24 lags, which is distributed 
2
24 χ . 
            
**, 
* significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.  
            
++, 
+ significantly different than 1 at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively.    43



































Source: Authors’ own calculation   44
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Table 9: Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Korea 
  
Intervention 
) (INTV  
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Table 10: Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Singapore 
 Intervention 
) (INTV  
Interest Rate 
H
r pint  
Singapore Dollar 
H
exr p  
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
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Table 11: Smoothed Probabilities and INTV Index for Thailand 
  
Intervention 









exr p  
 
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
H


































































































































0.0013   48
























91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
RUPIAH  49
Figure 1b: 
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Figure 2b: 
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Figure 3b: 
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Figure 4b: 
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